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Existence and Negativity  




Jan Patočka should have a prominent place among philosophers who 
emphasized the essentially negative character of human existence.* This holds 
true at least for reflections he wrote in the second half of the 1940s.1 Patočka 
thus found himself in the neighborhood of Sartre’s existentialism, 
Heidegger’s philosophy of being, and Hegel’s dialectic, and at the same time 
in opposition to schools of thought which either completely reject the 
substantive use of “the nothing,” such as Carnap’s positivism, or relativize it, 
like Bergson. It is the latter polemic, Patočka’s polemic with Bergson, which I 
will discuss in some detail here. This encounter sheds some light on the 
meaning of negativity in Patočka. In his thinking, the concept of negativity 
basically refers to the idea that human existence is defined by a capacity to 
adopt a distance toward what is pre-given, be it the reality of the physical 
world or the established habits and rules of a particular society. Negativity 
qua distance has in Patočka an absolute character. It is this claim that he 
defends in his critique of Bergson. 
 The main part of my article attempts to reconstruct Patočka’s position. 
I claim that the wager on absolute negativity—in a meaning yet to be 
determined—does not make Patočka a nihilist, and that is for one particular 
reason: the interest in negativity is paralleled by a sustained philosophical 
interest in the concept of totality, be it the totality of one’s own life or of the 
surrounding world. Patočka is thus not a nihilist, but a philosopher of a 
negative holism, and, in a sense, even a moralist. Above and beyond a 
reconstruction of Patočka’s stance, I will spell out some reservations I have. 
Patočka’s negative holism makes frequent, yet somewhat indiscriminate use 
of the category of “negation,” tending to downplay important distinctions. It 
is, to give but one example, objectionable to call a “horizon” of a perceived 
object or its hidden side its “negation.” But, more important, what is the 
systematic meaning of Patočka’s recourse to negativity? Is negation really 
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what is at stake—even for Patočka? I will suggest that negation is not 
everything, and that, taken separately, it is not even absolute. Negation is an 
indispensable part of a more complex existential structure Patočka is aiming 
at. The terms he uses for this structure include “thirst for the absolute,” “thirst 
for reality,” “restlessness of the heart,” and “desire.” To translate these 
allusions onto a general plan, it is useful to talk about the capacity to establish 
differences that matter. As general as it seems, this turn of phrase can grasp 
both Patočka’s emphasis on negativity, and his emphasis on the absolute, the 
latter, nevertheless, not residing in a distance from being, but in differences 
established, maintained, and abandoned by ourselves within being. 
 I suggest that one read the reflections that Patočka developed in these 
essays as his pursuing at least two interrelated, yet distinct tasks. First of all, 
Patočka embarks on a philosophical anthropology which—in close proximity 
to the philosophy of existence—attempts to grasp the “essence of humanity.”2 
What is more, in Patočka this task leads straight into ethics. The task of 
philosophy, however, is not merely to define human existence and draw 
conclusions for ethics, but also to “think the world.” Thus, apart from the 
ethical orientation, Patočka makes an “attempt at an ontology on existential 
grounds.”3 
The elaboration of the first task is defined by Patočka in detailed polemics 
against value relativism and nihilism on the one hand, and against value 
objectivism on the other. While Patočka associated value relativism, for 
instance, with Sartre, he identified value objectivism with various versions of 
Platonism, be it with Plato himself or with Max Scheler and Emanuel Rádl. 
The ethics formulated by Patočka seeks to break out of this duality between 
relativistic ethics, whereby values are determined by individual subjects, and 
ethical objectivism, which attributes real existence to values.4 For him, the 
human capacity to negate partial goals pursued by an individual in the course 
of his or her life plays a key role in overcoming this duality. Alluding to Saint 
Augustine, Patočka speaks of the restlessness of the heart, or the “absolute 
thirst” of the heart, on the basis of which he characterizes human existence as 
“non-satisfaction by every finite, positive goal. It is the consciousness of the 
relativity of every concrete goal.”5 Patočka interprets Socrates’ knowledge of 
not knowing precisely as the negation of partial ends. It is thanks to the 
knowledge of not knowing that we depart from every relativism and pursue 
“an internal unity and concentration of life.”6 
The second philosophical task to “think the world” aims at showing that 
the way human existence relates to its environment is the basis for a theory of 
knowledge and ontology. Patočka contends that consciousness is 
indispensable for any objective knowledge, which puts him against various 
versions of materialism and in line with more subjectivist philosophies. At the 
same time, he opposes versions of the philosophy of subject which would 
describe human experience as a passive process taking place within the 
subject and with no claim to objective validity. Though we experience the 
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world from a certain point of view, always perspectively and partially, our 
knowledge exhibits a priori structures. For example, our embodied ability to 
focus on a perceived object and to isolate it from its surroundings is one such 
a priori.7 In developing this position, drawing on selected motifs from 
Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Patočka emphasizes the 
human capacity to connect what is present with what is absent, for example, 
with the still unseen parts of an object. Characteristically, for Patočka the 
experience of perspective is an experience of negativity: 
Perspective is an Urphänomen, one of the great speculative 
experiences: that in the finite the non-finite is given, that the 
finite is possible only in the non-finite, that the present is 
[conceivable] only as a view of the absent, that nothing is 
just identical to itself—what a source of wonder here. The 
negative moment in perspective: perspective means that 
the “positively given” is only a tiny part of the negatively 
given, that the absent, the indirect, has an immense 
preponderance.8 
Within the task of “thinking the world,” the philosophy developed by 
Patočka again emphasizes negativity. For Patočka, the a priori component of 
our relation to the world consists not primarily in the positive structuring of 
phenomena, for example, according to the figure—background form, but “in 
distancing from the object.” He describes the a priori of our contact with things 
as “the creation of a spatium in which the encounter with the concrete can take 
place,” which leads him explicitly to espouse a negative conception of the a 
priori.9 
 The philosophical project pursued by Patočka highlights negativity 
both in ethics—as non-satisfaction by finite ends—and in the theory of 
knowledge and ontology, where it becomes the distance through which we 
gain any access at all to things. By placing negativity and nothingness at the 
center of his attention, Patočka comes close to authors such as Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel, but, conversely, very far, at least in this respect, from 
Bergson, who considers the philosophical problem of nothingness a pseudo-
problem. In his unpublished essay “Nothingness, Absolute Position and 
Negation” (1947 or 1948),10 Patočka develops a sustained critique of Bergson 
precisely on this point. 
Patočka valued Bergson’s philosophy highly from his early writings on. 
Though he wrote The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem (1936) from the 
position of Husserl’s phenomenology, Patočka makes frequent use of the 
notion of life, and in its conclusion even uses Bergson’s term “creative 
evolution” to label the task of reconstructing the history of the human world.11 
Similarly, Patočka’s wartime manuscripts hover close to the philosophy of 
life.12 But in Patočka’s philosophical project of the second half of the 1940s, we 
no longer find vitalist elements. The explicit polemic with Bergson thus has 
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several meanings. It is evidence of a break in Patočka’s relationship with 
vitalism; it is an important text in which Patočka formulates his conception of 
negation and nothingness; and it is one of the few texts in which his emphasis 
on negativity is developed not only in the ethical, but also in the ontological 
context. Let us start, then, by restating Bergson’s account of nothingness. 
 
Bergson: Nothingness as a Pseudo-problem 
Bergson claims that the concept of absolute nothingness implies a 
contradiction. Consequently, Leibniz’s question of why there is something 
rather than nothing at all turns out to be a pseudo-problem. For Bergson, the 
seemingly simple notion “nothing” always contains at least two components: 
the idea of replacing one thing with another and the feeling of regret we 
associate with the replacement. For example, when we take a guest through a 
room that has not yet been furnished, we may very well say that there is 
nothing in it. We both know that the room is full of air, but, as Bergson points 
out, we can hardly sit on it. The nothing we have in mind is nothing to sit on. 
In this precise and relative sense, the notion of nothingness is well justified. 
We encounter nothingness only in the realm of human action, and it is always 
a relative nothingness, relative to what could be in a given place, relative to 
what we might wish for instead of what is there. As Bergson puts it, “in this 
quite relative sense . . . we are constantly going from the void to the full.”13 
Importantly for Bergson, the two elements that make up the idea of nonbeing 
are both positive: in ourselves, we find a feeling of regret, which is positive 
because it is de facto an expectation, a preference, a wish, a desire; and in the 
world that lacks something, we find a substitute—namely, the presence of a 
thing different from the thing that could have been there. 
 This gives Bergson’s notion of nothingness a more precise contour. 
Nothingness, the nonbeing (le néant) does not mean the opposite of being. In 
this, Bergson is close to Plato’s Sophist dialogue, where nonbeing is “not the 
opposite of being, but only the other of being” (not enantion, but heteron; Soph. 
258b). If we say that something is not great, we are not thereby saying that it 
is nonexistent. On the contrary, it does exist, yet is something other than the 
great. Similarly, for Bergson, the “partial nought” (le néant partiel) consists not 
in the fact that a thing is replaced “by a void which it leaves, that is, by the 
negation of itself,” but in the fact that it is replaced by another thing.14 
Nothingness is denied the potential to negate the existent, to be its opposite 
(enantion), and is converted into a relation of difference to it (heteron ekeinou). 
It is thus possible to speak of “nonbeing” without claiming that a void has 
appeared in being. 
 Bergson defends this conviction in his discussion of affirmative and 
negative judgments. A negative judgment is not the symmetrical opposite of 
an affirmative judgment; it is not a judgment by which we deny the existence 
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of a thing or deny it a property. A negative judgment is an affirmative 
judgment of the second order: the sentence “this table is not white” refers (a) 
to a judgment that someone has made or could make about the table in front 
of us (namely, that it is white), (b) and asserts that something else will have to 
be said about the table in question other than attributing to it the property 
“white.” By making a negative judgment, we are positively communicating 
to someone—whether to ourselves or to another—that “he ought to affirm 
something else (though without specifying the affirmation which must be 
substituted).”15 A negative judgment is social in nature, a warning of possible 
error, of the “need of substituting for an affirmative judgment another 
affirmative judgment.”16 By negative judgments we do not deny that 
something exists, but seek to prevent or correct mistakes about our 
knowledge of what is. 
We do experience the absence of things and pronounce negative 
judgments, yet we should not draw unjustified conclusions from this. First, 
we should not assume that there is nothingness in the world if by this we 
mean nonbeing posited against being. In the world, we constantly encounter 
existing things, and the nothingness we find in the world is not the absence of 
things. What we encounter is “the absence not so much of a thing, as of a 
utility.”17 Second, the idea of nothingness understood as the absence of the 
utility of an existing thing cannot account for the idea of absolute nothingness. 
If we generalize this partial nonbeing (the “partial nought”)—which is in fact 
a being that has no use for us—and conceive the idea of absolute nothingness 
(as the absence not of one but of all things), the result is a contradiction. For if 
nothingness implies the substitution of one thing for another, then the 
removal of everything is inconceivable. The notion of absolute nothingness is 
self-destructive. The question of why there is anything at all, rather than 
nothing, is a pseudo-problem based on a fundamentally flawed notion of 
negation, void, and nonbeing.18 
Bergson’s critique of nothingness constitutes an important part of a 
philosophy that understands reality as an ever-changing creation of the new. 
We cannot understand reality as the unpredictable emergence of the new as 
long as we project into it habits taken from the realm of action. If we free 
ourselves from these concerns of utility, we acquire an enlarged perception 
and touch the absolute: “the Absolute is revealed very near us and, in a certain 
measure, in us. . . . It lives with us.”19 In Bergson’s philosophy, the absolute 
can be immediately given. Patočka is heading toward a philosophy in which 
the absolute is never immediately given, but resides, on the contrary, distant 
from the given, in the denial of being, that is, in nothingness. 
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Patočka’s Polemic with Bergson 
Before Patočka discusses Bergson’s position, which “seems so clear that 
it cannot be objected to,”20 he gives a brief overview of the conceptions of 
nothingness in Heidegger, Sartre, and Hegel. This overview fulfills a dual 
function. First, Patočka lists the grounds on which one might object to 
Bergson’s doctrine. Second, he reflects on whether he himself would use these 
to disagree with Bergson. To each of the conceptions of nothingness reported 
here, Patočka adds a critical commentary, showing why he does not fully 
identify with any of the alternatives to Bergson’s view. 
Patočka appreciates that Bergson draws attention to the practical and 
emotional context of our experience of nothingness, but considers 
Heidegger’s account of anxiety to be a more consistent elaboration of this 
“feeling of nothingness.” In deep anxiety, we experience how none of the 
objects around us offers us support and refuge. Nothingness, which refers 
here to “the insignificance of all objects,” confronts us explicitly with the 
question of our own being: “the fact of being becomes urgent, conspicuous.” 
The question for Patočka, however, is whether what the experience of anxiety 
reveals is “indeed absolute nothingness” rather than “pure being.”21 
Similarly, Sartre’s doctrine is an important elaboration of the “experience of 
nothingness,” but in Sartre it is linked to a particular notion of consciousness. 
Sartrean consciousness brings nothingness into the world because, as 
consciousness of itself, it is internally divided. Patočka distrusts Sartre’s thesis 
of an internally split consciousness, which lives in disunity with itself and 
projects this lack of being outside itself.22 Concerning Hegel, Patočka admits 
that his dialectic could introduce contradiction and drama into philosophical 
reflections about nothingness. For Patočka, however, the dialectic is 
ultimately a static structure, and, more importantly, negation and 
nonexistence in the dialectical process is only “transitory and apparent.”23 In 
his critique of Bergson, Patočka does not rely on Hegelian dialectics, Sartre’s 
concept of consciousness, or Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety. 
 Patočka’s objections to Bergson can usefully be summarized as three 
main ideas. First, Bergson does not offer a plausible analysis of our relation to 
things and changes which surround us and always combine presence with 
absence. Second, Bergson underestimates the negative character of some 
emotions and is completely wrong when claiming that negative emotions can 
be converted into positive desire. Third, while rejecting the idea of absolute 
nothingness, Bergson works with the notion of the whole as the sum of the 
parts, which is unacceptable. Patočka offers an alternative rethinking of the 
relationship between nothingness and the whole: in order to conceive of the 
whole at all, we must transcend it. 
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(a) Our relation to things and their changes: givenness is always a 
correlate of non-givenness. 
The first set of objections rests on the observation that a plausible account 
of the human relationship to things and their transformations always connects 
the present and the absent. In perception, a thing stands out against its 
background; it has a back side that is not given but could become the object 
of our perception. Patočka sometimes refers to the context or “horizon” of a 
thing as its negation, and it is important for him that we have here a case of 
“negation of a certain being without substitution by another being,” that we 
have an absence as part of our perception.24 Concerning the absence of the 
unseen side of a thing, Bergson would account for it on the basis of the model 
of substitution. This, however, Patočka finds insufficient: “the negative is not 
simply there by virtue of this substitution, but the substitution as such, the 
substitution of distinct individualities already presupposes a negative 
element, the presence of absence, the negative givenness as something 
original.”25 
Not only perception and our capacity for perceptual discrimination, but 
also recollection and imagination demonstrate that non-reality cannot be 
explained by the idea of substitution.26 In general, the distinction between the 
real and the non-real “cannot come from pure realities, which are always 
positive.”27 
Bergson might reply to Patočka that the perception separating and then 
connecting the given and the not-given is characteristic only of our ordinary, 
practical concerns, that “distinct perception is merely cut, for the purposes of 
practical existence, out of a wider canvas.” If we nevertheless expand our 
perception, we find “that reality is change, that change is indivisible, and that 
in an indivisible change the past is one with the present.”28 Patočka, however, 
makes a rather harsh observation concerning Bergson’s idea of expanded 
perception. It is, he writes, a naive “pan-aesthetic ideal,” which was already 
rejected by Aristotle and, in another context, by Husserl, and “is in fact an 
ideal of utter stupidity.”29 
The decisive argument, however, is built by Patočka on a different 
analysis of change. The substitution of one thing for another presupposes that 
we hold the two things together, that is, within a common dimension. Moving 
from one reality to another presupposes something “in the face of which, in 
relation to which, both stand on the same level,” and this something cannot 
itself be reality again.30 At one point, Patočka calls this “something” the 
temporal dimension. Nevertheless, he does not want to hastily identify the 
environment in which we grasp the substitution of one thing by another with 
linear time. Instead, he speaks of perspective. In one remark, it is perspective 
that is declared to be that dimension “within which” things alternate, a 
dimension that is “itself nothing real.”31 Regardless of whether we call time, 
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the horizon, or perspective the dimension of substitution, it is always 
something that is neither actual nor fully present.32 
Following his observation that in our relationship to surrounding things 
and changes we always associate being and nonbeing with each other, 
Patočka rejects Bergson’s interpretation of negative judgments. The claim that 
a negative judgment is an affirmative judgment of the second degree deprives 
negative judgment of a direct relationship to things. Perception is already 
imbued with negativity, for it connects being with nonbeing. The same is true 
of negative judgments, whether we distinguish one thing from another or 
state that one thing has been replaced by another and no longer exists. Both 
the distinguishing negation (A is not B) and the suppressing negation (B) 
instead of (A) relate to things, not merely to another judgment: “negation 
quite obviously expresses a relation among things, and not merely a relation 
to a possible judgment.”33 Negative judgments are about things and their 
relations, not judgments about other judgments. For Patočka, negativity—be 
it perceptual negativity or negativity in judgments—refers to reality.34 
 
(b) Bergson downplays emotional negativity. 
Regret, which constitutes part of our experience of nothingness, is for 
Bergson not a negative emotion, but a positive desire for something that is not 
given in the present reality. Patočka thinks that Bergson underestimates the 
negative character of some emotions and that he is completely wrong to claim 
that lacking something can be completely rephrased in terms of a positive 
desire. 
 What is involved in desire is not merely the experience that what is 
present is different from what I desire (as Bergson suggests it is), but the 
experience that what I desire is not present, and what is present, is 
insufficient. Negativity cannot be smoothly converted into a relationship of 
difference. “Desiring, lacking, is ipso facto something negative: the 
consciousness of the absence of something, and this consciousness is wholly 
original and irreducible.”35 Only by admitting that lacking does have a 
negative character can we explain why we experience substitution, that is, the 
presence of a thing different from what is desired, as nothingness. As Patočka 
points out, Bergson himself thus implicitly presupposes the negative 
character of desire. 
 At this point, it would suffice to show that however positive desire may 
be, the negative element cannot be completely removed from it, at least not 
until it is a satisfied desire. Patočka, nevertheless, goes even further in his 
discussion of the negativity present in some emotions. He draws attention to 
emotions that are purely negative, to the “emotional denial” that we 
experience in dislike, aversion, disgust, or pain. Such a denial is distinguished, 
for example, from fantasy, which makes us see the possible, which is 
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contained in the given, or from desire, which makes us see or feel an absence 
in the given. “Emotional denial,” argues Patočka, “means nothing other than 
I do not accept.”36 True, Bergson also mentions “dissatisfaction,”37 but it is a 
dissatisfaction motivated by an unfulfilled desire for another thing. Patočka 
believes there is a dissatisfaction in which we do not seek to be satisfied by 
something else. Our affectivity includes not only attitudes such as a 
frustration that seeks satisfaction elsewhere, but also such emotions that 
consist only in defiance, in protest. There is a kind of negation which is not 
positive striving; there is a denial without a substitute. 
 
(c) In criticizing the notion of “absolute nothingness,” Bergson 
presupposes an erroneous notion of the whole. 
Bergson’s proof—namely, that the notion of absolute nothingness is self-
contradictory—is based on the assumption that we cannot generalize partial 
negations. Every negation is essentially a substitution, and one cannot 
justifiably conceive of the substitution of everything. Patočka points out that 
Bergson’s reasoning is already problematic the moment he speaks of the 
whole. According to Bergson, we form the concept of the whole or of the all 
(le tout) in the following way: “By affirming one thing, and then another, and 
so on ad infinitum, I form the idea of ‘All.’”38 Patočka refuses to follow Bergson 
in this step. Bergson’s philosophy lacks the concept of the world, the whole, 
the universe: “We have only a general concept of all existing realities, but not 
the universe as one all-encompassing individuum.”39 Not only is it impossible 
to conceive the negation of the all as a gradual negation of parts going to 
infinity, but the whole, the all, cannot be thought of as merely a collection of 
parts. 
 Here Patočka draws on the phenomenological analyses of the whole 
which are to some extent developed already in the first objection: the horizon 
of a thing cannot be derived from the thing, the dimension in which the thing 
appears (spatial and temporal perspective) is not derivable from the thing and 
yet is essential to it. Here we are making an experience of a more 
encompassing whole that is not the sum of its parts. “The whole is not the 
sum of the parts” is familiar to Patočka from both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s 
philosophy and forms a recurring motif in The Natural World as a Philosophical 
Problem: “the unity of the world is not the unity of the materials composing 
it.”40 In the 1930s, however, Patočka defends the idea that the human spirit is 
the necessary world-making agent. The sentence I have just quoted continues: 
the unity of the world is “the unity of the spirit that shapes and sustains it.” 
In the second half of the 1940s, however, it is not the notion of spirit but the 
notion of negation which is crucial for conceiving of the whole: if we are to 
conceive of the whole, we must transcend it, we must step outside being. 
While Bergson raises the merely rhetorical question, “How then can the idea 
of Nought be opposed to that of All?”41 Patočka argues that we must do just 
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that: through nothingness understood as the negation of being in its totality, 
we can relate to the whole. Not only is it possible, it is even necessary to 
conceive the idea of nothingness and the idea of the whole of being as defined 
by their contraposition. This systematic linking together of the concepts of 
nothingness and the whole forms one of the main motifs of Patočka’s 
reflections. 
 
Patočka’s Negative Holism 
For Patočka, the capacity to relate to the whole is a salient feature of 
human existence as distinct from the life of animals or the existence of things. 
Whereas in The Natural World Patočka strives from the very first pages to give 
a positive account of the unity of the world, after World War II he regards the 
“doctrine of the whole” as a metaphysical theory that is no longer tenable. A 
philosophy that neither forgets the human relationship to the whole, nor 
transforms it into a metaphysical doctrine can approach the whole only 
negatively.42 In this period of Patočka’s thought, nothingness and negation 
enjoy a privileged position not because of some temporary inclination toward 
nihilism. Nothingness paradoxically offers itself as a non-metaphysical 
possibility of a holistic relationship. Patočka’s negative philosophy is not 
nihilism but, so to say, negative holism. 
 Following our initial distinction between the two directions of Patočka’s 
philosophical preoccupations here, we should explore his negative approach 
to the whole separately in two main areas, ethics and ontology. Although 
rough, the distinction is important, because the relevant concept of the whole 
is each time different: one time the whole of human life is at stake, the other 
time the whole of reality. Thus, the questions that arise are also substantially 
different. Similarly, negation assumes a different role each time. 
 
(a) Negativity and the totality of life 
To the extent that he focuses on individual self-accomplishment, the 
whole that Patočka is concerned with is “individual human destiny.”43 This 
whole can only be aimed at by problematizing the individual goals we 
pursue; it cannot be aimed at directly. Patočka links the capacity to distance 
oneself from the individual goals one pursues in life to an Augustinian 
restlessness of the heart, adding: 
this absolute thirst is not just something negative. It is a 
dissatisfaction with every finitude, with every positive 
goal. It is the consciousness of the relativity of every 
concrete goal. And yet only in fidelity to concrete goals 
does this negativity manifest itself positively. . . . Not 
absolute relativism, but relative absolutism. Never to lose 
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the thirst for the absolute is to introduce the absolute into 
the relative. And that is the only way the absolute can live, 
the only way the world can make sense.44 
If the notion of the absolute can be preserved in the current post-metaphysical 
situation, more precisely in philosophical ethics, it can only be achieved 
negatively. Nothingness is the last absolute we have left. When Patočka 
speaks of “givenness” in ethics, it is not the givenness of individual things or 
facts, but the givenness of the goals we have adopted for our lives, of 
traditions, habits, and routines.45 “Negativity” here consist in the capacity to 
break out of this givenness and to see these goals as insufficient, to regard a 
life that is led habitually, unreflectively, as a life afflicted by negativity, as but 
a semblance of a true life. “Dissatisfaction with every finitude” thus turns out 
to be positive. It is the negation of the apparent, the overcoming of the 
negativity of the unreflected life, the negation of negation. Patočka uses the 
vocabulary of Hegel and Marx, for whom the negation of negation is the 
“overcoming of alienation.” From a purely formal point of view, Socrates’ 
striving is a negation of the same type: “The negation of negation is also 
Socrates’ concern for the soul.”46 Thus, the knowledge of not knowing and the 
negation of all partial goals is reversed into a positive choice of being: “by 
rejecting relative goals [. . .], we achieve a concentration of life and a return 
from negativity to positivity, to full being.”47 This does not mean that 
Patočka’s ethics presents a positive solution for the individual existence to 
follow. If one can speak of a solution at all, it consists in relentless questioning: 
“the solution is in the question that becomes the form of life.”48 Yet in a sense 
we do get beyond constant negation; we leave the “bad infinite,”49 and 
through negation we achieve a way of life which Patočka characterizes in 
highly positive terms such as “life concentration,” “fullness of being,” “true 
being,” and “self-accomplishment.”50 
 
(b) Negativity and the totality of being 
Philosophy for Patočka also entails the task to “think the world.” The 
cosmological concept of the whole enters the scene. The term “givenness” no 
longer refers to a life-goal or a socially recognized routine, but to an individual 
entity, a thing or a fact we encounter. Negation here does not take the form of 
a rejection of partial goals and established habits, but of “cosmic 
nothingness,” a turn of phrase Patočka uses somewhat loosely to describe the 
nothingness uncovered in Heideggerian anxiety. The first thesis of this 
cosmology states that if we are to relate to the whole, we must transcend it 
without denying it: 
The idea of the whole must, in a sense, go beyond this 
whole. Thus, the whole presupposes not only existing 
things, realities, but also the transcensus of existing things 
without their denial. But this transcending without denying 
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is necessarily a transcendence to non-being [. . .] 
Nothingness is the unsatisfactoriness in the given being, the 
demand of the not-given.51 
Patočka makes immediately clear that we do not arrive at this 
nothingness from the Bergsonian understanding of nothingness as the 
replacement of one being by another: “by negating the [particular] being we 
do not arrive at nothingness. Nevertheless, we do have a relation to being in 
totality; there must therefore be another negation than the negation of a 
particular being by another particular being.”52 
This general thesis about nothingness, which consists in the negation of 
the whole of being, is complemented (in the course of the polemic with 
Bergson) by at least one consequence: it is precisely thanks to the capacity for 
total distancing ourselves from being as such that we are able to establish 
partial distances within being. It is because we can distance ourselves from 
being in general that we can establish partial differences between things, 
penetrate into their relationships and offer an interpretation of them. “The fact 
that we are not satisfied by the given, by the factual, the finite,” according to 
Patočka, manifests itself “also in the fact that we are unsatisfied by a particular 
given and the factual. (1) The effort to penetrate further into the factual. (2) 
The effort to analyze, dismantle the factual. (3) The effort to interpret the 
factual, to find its basis.”53 The “no” uttered over being in general is the 
presupposition of all differentiation. In other words, the first precondition of 
understanding is negation. Reason presupposes the “negation of the given” 
which Patočka, nevertheless, also calls a desire or “thirst for reality.”54 This 
assertion—that it is through total distance from being that we are capable of 
partial differentiations within being—allows Patočka to conceive of his 
holistic negation as a positive step: total distance allows us to relate to being; 
it is an “ontological circumscription: away from being, back to being.”55 
Negation is the condition of encountering. 
 
What is Negation? 
Patočka derives nothingness from negation. Absolute nothingness makes 
sense only when linked to the negating process, not as a state of utter 
emptiness or nonexistence, the meaninglessness of which Bergson denied. 
There is no nothingness without negation. Patočka distinguishes between 
partial negation on the one hand and total negation on the other. He 
distinguishes two kinds of partial negation: negation that distinguishes 
(negatio distinctiva, negation of difference) and negation that suppresses 
(negatio suppletiva, negation of contradiction).56 Under the distinguishing 
negation, if I understand Patočka correctly, falls any determination of the 
differences between two things. Under negation of contradiction falls 
replacement of one thing by another one, or a conflict of two forces in which 
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one prevails over the other. One thing is not only different from another, but 
is chased from being by another. 
 Patočka considers the active, suppressing, “contradicting” type of 
negation to be more important for the very concept of negation. What is more, 
he suggests that the “contradicting negation” does not have to consist in 
replacing one thing with another; it can be negation without replacement. He 
uses a number of synonyms for this latter type of negation, including 
resistance, defiance, distance, rejection, and protest. Moreover, he proposes to 
generalize this antithetical negation without replacement, that is, to relate it 
to the whole of reality. In this way, our experience of contradictions arrives at 
“something general—at the idea of the negativity of objective being in 
general.”57 
An obvious question is where this total negation comes from. Given what 
we find in the Patočka essays examined here, we can say that stepping outside 
of reality altogether is a defining feature of consciousness.58 It seems that this 
negation is not an act that we may or may not perform. Being an a priori 
structure of our existence, it is something through which we gain access both 
to ourselves and to the reality around us. Patočka makes this point 
particularly forcefully by emphasizing the affective and involuntary character 
of the negation. To underscore the non-optional nature of the transcendence 
we always perform, he highlights the role of “emotional denial” in his polemic 
with Bergson and the role of “negative affection” in Eternity and Historicity.59 
The stepping beyond being, the distancing oneself from the given, 
translates into the two basic tasks assumed by Patočka’s philosophy: an 
ontological task and an ethical one. Transcending reality can explain both our 
relating to the world (“intentional sense-making”) and our “moral life,” 
which for Patočka is “the first, practical understanding of a fundamentally 
negative feature of our essence.”60 It is one thing to negate the partial goals of 
life (which is the presupposition of life’s unification) and another to 
experience dissatisfaction with the given (which is the precondition to any 
discriminating knowledge of reality). Both types of negation are, however, 
grounded in the structure of consciousness as a negation of the given. 
The question necessarily arises whether Patočka’s conception, despite his 
distrust concerning the formality of Hegel’s dialectic, is not ultimately 
dialectical, that is, based on the mutual and dynamic interdependence of the 
positive and the negative. Even for Patočka himself, the consciousness that 
negates the given is to be characterized by a “dialectic of negative affection 
and fully positive being.”61 In this dialectic, however, the “no” is not related 
to the “yes” in order to form a new synthesis. There is no Aufhebung in 
Patočka. He even uses vocabulary that is, rather, reminiscent of the pre-
dialectical phase of German idealism when he speaks of consciousness that 
posits itself by the negation of the object.62 
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 Before we consider the possible problems of the doctrine of negativity 
as a defining feature of consciousness, let us interpose an observation on how 
the philosophy of Patočka and the philosophy of Bergson relate to each other. 
This will provide some interesting insights, though the differences between 
the two positions are fundamental and any comparison at this point can only 
be general. 
 
Bergson versus Patočka: the Absolute as Creative 
Becoming and the Absolute as Negation 
Bergson’s philosophy and Patočka’s postwar philosophy can be seen as 
two inverted conceptions of the absolute. For Bergson, the absolute is creative 
becoming. Patočka himself accurately captures this idea when he claims that 
for Bergson “the absolute can exist in temporal form (as duration).”63 The 
basic state of mind of the philosophy of creative becoming is joy. 
 Patočka does not embrace the absolute of creative becoming, but the 
absolute of negation. In the “thirst for the absolute,” every particular entity is 
insufficient, every attained goal is relative. The basic state of the philosophy 
of absolute thirst is non-satisfaction. For Patočka, only an absolutely 
unsatisfied being can relate to reality, can penetrate it, for only through the 
constant possibility of distance does it have the ability to make any 
distinctions at all. The inexhaustible distance is neither escape nor relativism, 
because it is only on this ground that a discriminating attitude toward entities 
and the advocacy of partial goals are possible. 
 For both thinkers, the absolute is the source of human freedom. Bergson 
aligns freedom with creativity, not with deliberation and choice. Patočka also 
refuses to consider the choice between alternatives to be the main form of 
freedom, not in order to weaken the motif of distance, but in order to 
radicalize it: while in choice we choose between one and the other option, that 
is, we work with difference (negation is the “distinguishing negation” here), 
in transcending we act out the “neantization,” the “negation of contradition,” 
the simple “no.” Freedom is not “creative becoming” within being, but a 
rupture with being, a withdrawal from being, a protest. Both the absolute of 
creative becoming and the absolute of the “no” that is uttered over being as 
such implies that choice and decision-making is not the key element of 
freedom.64 For Bergson, the core of freedom is the union with “élan vital”; for 
Patočka, it is the extrication of the human being from thoughtless immersion 
in given reality. 
Still, Patočka and Bergson situate freedom outside the phenomenon of 
choice for utterly different reasons. Only Patočka’s conception of freedom 
implies an extreme amplification of the chasm that separates the human being 
from all other entities, be they animate or inanimate. Patočka is thus an ardent 
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supporter of anthropological difference. Only the human being, “unlike any 
other animal,” exists “at a distance from reality in its totality.”65 
 
Conclusion 
Patočka’s philosophical position in the second half of the 1940s raises a 
number of objections. The first problem is the indiscriminate use of the 
concept of “negation.” In connection with the notion of horizon, Patočka 
succeeds in showing that every perception includes the non-present. But the 
very designation of the horizon as the “negation” of the thing poses a 
problem. Although the horizon cannot be derived from the given thing, it is 
not necessarily the negation of it, but a dimension of its appearing. Similarly 
the back side of the present object is the not-yet-given of this very thing, the 
present possibility of a future presence, so it is misleading to label it a negation 
of the given.66 Even if it is true that in our perception we always transcend the 
given, it does not follow that we must negate the given entity in order to 
perceive it, nor does it follow that we must transcend being as a whole. The 
real challenge for a reader of Patočka lies in his rapid transition from partial 
negation to total negation (and back). 
The second problem is the claim that the ability to make distinctions 
derives from the universal ability to negate. This is a variant of the thesis 
“omnis determinatio est negatio,” or rather of its Sartrean reinterpretation, 
“every negation is determination,” which Sartre develops in admirable detail 
in Being and Nothingness for quantitative properties of things.67 And Patočka 
seems to make a similar assumption: at the basis of every individual 
difference is negation. But the claim that all distinctions are negations and that 
partial negations are grounded in total negation68 requires a more detailed 
justification, which is not found in Patočka. 
The third problem that Patočka’s project raises is that it considers all non-
human beings as indifferent. Patočka explicitly speaks of the “indifference of 
the utter outwardness” of non-human entities. It is up to us “to substitute our 
lives for their essential shortcoming.”69 A non-human being, for example, if 
left to itself, stands in no relation to time unless it is introduced into 
temporality by a human being.70 A philosophy that characterizes humanity 
by the exclusive capacity for absolute negation radically distances humanity 
from anything that lacks this capacity. 
What have we gained by wagering on absolute negation? In the realm of 
ethics, this wager should have guaranteed us a break from value relativism, 
but without having to espouse value realism. Despite Patočka’s assurances, 
the question remains, how exactly the relativization of all partial goals leads 
not away from the pursuit of any goals but back to them; how does it 
“introduce the absolute into the relative.” Patočka’s explanation of why his 
absolutist move is not a relativization lies in proposing the possibility of a life 
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for which living in problematicity becomes a “form of life.” Still, we might 
well conceive of a philosophy of relative ends that would give more weight 
to the choice or conflict of those particular ends, while preserving the tension 
of life that Patočka is ultimately after, without resorting to the notion of the 
negative absolute. In the realm of ontology, the benefit of the wager on 
transcendence in relation to being in totality was the preservation of the a 
priori structure in which the world appears to us and through which we 
discover individual differences in the world. Here, the explanation provided 
by Patočka is much more fragmentary and much less satisfactory than in the 
field of ethics. 
Patočka’s attempt to characterize human existence primarily in terms of 
negation may have succeeded in avoiding ethical relativism and, to a limited 
extent, a subjectivist conception of the world, but it comes at a high price. The 
human being distances himself or herself from the world and becomes a 
homeless stranger in an indifferent world. While Bergson, thanks to his 
positive account of being (which implies his critique of absolute nothingness) 
can claim “we feel ourselves no longer isolated in humanity, humanity no 
longer seems isolated in the nature, that it dominates,”71 the philosophy of the 
negative absolute leaves the individual “at a distance from reality in its 
totality” and from individual things that are, taken in themselves, devoid of 
any meaning. Patočka’s attempts to integrate consciousness into the world— 
whether by accepting the relativity of life’s ends or by claiming that individual 
distinctions emerge from total negation—are more a symptom of a wrong 
starting point than a project yet to be completed. 
Nevertheless, we can make good use of Patočka’s critique of Bergson. The 
reason why Patočka distrusted Bergson’s abolition of the problem of 
nothingness is that he considered experiences of “tension,” “asperity,” 
“obstacle”72 or the “capacity to encounter and withstand resistance”73 to be 
necessary ingredients of existence. Though I believe that this intuition, which 
guides him in his critique of Bergson, is correct, this critique needs not be 
translated into a defense of the absolute character of negation as a 
fundamental feature of consciousness. What does remain absolute in a sense 
is the unmediated distinction between the positive and the negative, between 
“yes” and “no,” which applies to some of our experiences. Without depriving 
ourselves of the absolute, we can return from the “yes” and “no” uttered over 
being in totality to the “yes” and “no” we utter within being when we say yes 
or no to particular things and possibilities. There are significant life choices 
and evaluative acts concerning private and public life and even cognitive acts 
which are formulated as non-indifferent and in a sense absolute—namely, a 
sharp difference between “yes” and “no.”74 Many of our choices and 
evaluations though are matter of degree and thus fall more under the 
“distinguishing negation” than under the “negation of contradiction.” It 
would obviously be an exaggeration to say that we make sharp choices and 
adopt clear-cut positions all the time, but it would be equally wrong to say 
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that such choices are never encountered or even extremely rare. The absolute 
resides neither in fusion with the “élan vital,” nor in our distance from being, 
but emerges from time to time in the form of the capacity to make a 
fundamental, non-relative difference between options which are 
contradictory. The outcome of Patočka’s reflections on existence and 
negativity, I believe, is not the absolute of negation but the absolute of 
difference. Perhaps he would be willing to redefine the consciousness, which 
he conceived of as the capacity of negation, as the capacity of difference 
instead. It is not negation, but difference that absolutely matters. 
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